Neither did the previous comment provide any numbers lmfao? All it did was drag down a university without any purpose. OP here is discussing the culture of other NLUs dragging down its peers for no reason whatsoever, even when said university is doing so much to get back on its feet. Is this really the culture that we enjoy propogating?

KCO - 17.4 Lakhs fixed

BONUS:

1. Confirmation Bonus On probation confirmation within 6 months - 1.3 lakh

2. Performance Bonus - 2.5 lakhs

3. Bar Exam Bonus - 1.3 lakh

This is as per the rewards proposition shared with 2025-26 campus hires. Don’t know about the current status.

I am trying to register as a user and it shows me the error message that my first name is not as per my PAN details, but it is. I went to the income tax department and verified this, and it is the same as what is on my PAN card. Have any of you dealt with this? How do you fix it?

Lmao people really think a 10 month cash cow course (widely acknowledged by uni administrators btw, don't even try to deny it) changes lives. Please enlighten me, how does one "think differently" after doing a foreign llm? Unless you've had a substandard legal education in India? LLM courses are designed in a manner where it's extremely difficult to even fail a course. I should know, I teach at a top Russell Group uni. And enough of the 'sour grapes' arguments, I've read for an LLM at a premier London law school. I had a tier-1 law school education in India, and found very little difference in the courses, both teaching and pedagogy-wise.

I agree with the networking part, but how many of them are actually able to make succesful careers out of an LLM through networking? Very few. Every Tom, Dick, and Harry has a foreign llm these days. Even the number of oxbridge grads are quite significant. The people who are actually able to successfully make meaningful connections and better their career from an LLM are maybe 1 in 100. To think a 10 month degree is worth most middle-class families' life savings is foolhardy, to say the least.

Not from NLU, (assume one of the 2 priv law colleges), i have a single digit batch rank, good internships but all in TMT (so campus recruitment didn’t work out).

What can I do now? currently interning in a PE/VC boutique, I like it so far but no employment prospects here.

Which T1s and T2s can I look for? TMT/ transactions/ pe&vc

I am open to other teams too except Tax, Cap Marks and RE.

As someone entering their fourth year with no RCC to rely upon, I am really anxious about getting a PPO in disputes before graduating.

I need some realistic advice before I start throwing my CV into the void.

For context, I’ve done a couple of internships at T2 firms in disputes which I liked. In talks with one of them for a call-back. I also managed to intern with one of the T1 firms, albeit in a different practice area. I am at the top of my class and and have good co-curriculars as well.

I am trying to understand which firms (and if possible partner initials) should I target to maximise my chances of getting callbacks and a PPO.

I’m looking for Delhi NCR ideally, but I will happily brave the Mumbai locals if it means securing a job. I’m not blindly chasing only SAM / CAM / KCO / AZB /Tri either. I would love to work with firms like JSA, Saraf, Indus, Argus, DSK, B&P, etc. or frankly any firm that offers decent pay (80k plus) and I stand a decent chance of getting recruited. I can also do with lower pay for now, provided the firm is such that there are good prospects of laterally moving into a better paying position after 1-2 years.

Which firms, teams, or specific partners should I be targeting? Who is actually receptive to this kind of profile and has a track record of handing out PPOs?

Please drop names, my sanity (and my future) depends on it. Thanks!

Courage - to miss lunch ? And demand attention ? What is the realistic chance that anyone would even notice if Nalsar students hadn’t called attention to themselves ? Surely in their left wing law school ecosystem they’re only rewarded for this- who has actually been persecuted for this. No. I won’t be praising any performative idiots. Thanks.I actually think it might be more subversive to be openly heterodox in NLUS than to be boring old left wing.

Ngl, sad to see only juniors and aspirants sharing their disappointment. The one person who gave an insight, thanks. Other seniors pls help us out!!!! Please tell us what is happening and where are the jobs? Family pressure to take up low stakes litigation gigs till I get something on this field even if to step out of the house is becoming harder to put up with

I have a background in Capital Markets - Associate Trainee with a T 2 firm and I wish to pursue CS because i want to switch from Cap Marks to M&A altogether. For this I have decided to pursue CS and in order to support myself in a major metro I have decided to work with a company which is not known by people but they'll pay me enough to afford rent in Mumbai.

I am very sure that I will be able to clear CS. Do you think doing this is advisible?

PS I am from a small village and I need this money to stay in Mumbai

I know Axon, and I went a step further to explain what the theory underpinning it is. The rest of what you said is a distinction without a difference. Axon was one of the biggest wins for the Federalist Society that pushed the unitary executive theory. End of. Read: https://ndlawreview.org/interring-the-unitary-executive/ You also completely missed the point on state enforcement. I will not labour on it but will focus on the remaining aspects – a rather simple yet abstract question on the enforcement side.

You prioritise absolute fairness, as being unfair causes harm, but you forget that doing nothing or being slow is harm too. It is precisely in those scenarios we have developed summary procedures across judicial proceedings right from CPC. In those instances, we forego bits of fairness and reach for speed. Speed is just as much a normative value as fairness. We can argue on equilibrium and balance forever.

You acknowledge other regulators have suo moto powers – to be clear, they adjudicate too. Now rarely does a regulator stake a position against its own legislative mandate, lending a collateral constitutional claim for every litigation it faces. At this point the CCI is advocating for a fairness standard beyond its parent legislation. I see the cynicism in this. If the CCI saw risk, it should have instead said, "We will not take settlements or commitments for the time being" – not abandon its main mandate under Section 19(1).

I mean, think about this objectively: during COVID, the CCI specifically set out public warnings against crisis profiteering, and the threat it used to ensure people did not take advantage of a crisis in a market failure was its suo moto powers under Section 19(1). Removing that power is like a doctor not being able to prescribe medication because he is required to put in writing but he does not have a pen and paper.

Snooty nepo kid law grads are forming their own pickleball/padel cliques and excluding others. These people suck. First only T1 associates from played with each other. Then they started bitching about people who are non-nepo kids within that circle. Then cliques formed based on which law school and even which high school you went to. Extra points if you went abroad for higher studies, bonus 1000 point if you are old money. If you speak with the wrong accent and are from a small town in Bihar or UP or whatever, don’t even bother.

Caste system by another name.

I can assure you now one is getting into Oxford BCL unless they are a top ranker NLUs, Jindal, or extremely rarely from something like Symbiosis / ILS. Your CV is only one part of the application and ultimately it also depends on the LoRs and SoP. These colleges continue to be prestigious. Cambridge is relatively less competitive and more accommodating in in terms where have you done your LLB, but it is no joke either.

But I would say that since you are from a T-1 NLU and you want a career in India, I doubt there would not be any opportunity that you otherwise wouldn't have access to.

Plus it's not exactly a good idea to do an LLM just for the sake of prestige. Go only if you genuinely want to do it, either to specialise in a particular domain or want to try your hand at employment there (almost impossible for US, for UK and other jurisdictions there is a chance if you have a good profile and are at the top of your class in LLM as well) but there are no direct ways in which an LLM helps with employment (no campus recruitment and you are essentially on your own).

regardless of which from which college have you done your LLB from, its a disastrous to do an LLM using your own money unless you are so rich that 1-2 cr is pocket change for you.

So get some work experience first. If you still want to do it and finances allow or you secure a scholarship, go for it.

"if I don't want you to do something, I should be allowed that choice"

??

How is it YOUR 'choice' to govern someone else?

Choice = what you want to wear

When you want to govern what others wear, it's a direction, dictat, order. Not choice. lol.

It's insane how NLIU has significantly improved in terms of its placements this year and yet everyone around it wants to slander and defame it.

It no longer feels like law students are happy watching other law schools succeed, but rather find pleasure in dragging other law schools down and put forth their own agenda.

Maybe once in a while be a little truthful. NLIU this year has had a great year of PPOs with CAM, SAM, TRILEGAL, ICICI, S&R, AZB all offering PPOs . Day zero was conducted pretty well with the assistance of outside placement recruiting assistance companies that assisted and trained the students. This meant significant investment from the University that was approved. Infact this year even NDA has returned for campus placements after significant outreach. Other tier 2 firms are also increasing their hiring and NLIU offers insane internships through its alumni base

I’d argue it’s your comment which is misleading. Your sermons on federalism vs parliamentary system and the recent majoritarianism are valid. However, one of the biggest reasons the FTC no longer files cases before its own courts was the SCOTUS’ order in Axon, which permitted District Courts to hear challenges against the FTC on the precise grounds I raised - you can’t have an authority both bringing cases and deciding them.

On state enforcement, how does that argue against my point? How can procedural fairness be dependant on the number of potential plaintiffs?

If the argument in favour of politically appointed tribunals is the lack of judicial infrastructure how does that justify creating further conflicts of interests in the mechanism?

Lastly, you’re right many other regulators have suo moto powers and the CCI may be placed similarly with all of them. My concern is however more broad based and applies to the moral legitimacy of all such regulatory setups.

Has anyone else felt that some Tier 1 law firms (especially SAM) that publicly champion values like inclusivity, meritocracy, and people-first culture often don’t reflect those ideals internally?

In my experience, it sometimes feels more like a business driven by billables than by its people. Job satisfaction can take a back seat, increments and bonuses often feel opaque and disappointing, and promotions can appear to favour certain individuals rather than being based solely on merit.

That is down to the unmaking of the institution over a decade. Slowly but steadily. On the enforcement side we have a stillborn institution even after 25 years.

Originally, the DG and CCI were separate. Just like the EU Commissioners and DG Comp. They ended the Bhikaji Cama place separation and the power to appoint went to the CCI from the Central Government. The structural absorption of the DG created the first problem. It was solving for a lack of competition law knowledge and a loss of institution memory with the DG staffed by rotating officers.

The original separation was meant to mimic the independent prosecutor model. There was a reason the CCI could not originally close matters and why 26(8) had to be interpreted creatively. It removed discretionary power from the CCI. The matters before it were in rem. The college of commissioners were speaking to the market.

The CCI secretary ran the administrative side and the DG office ran the investigative side. Constantly rotated out and the DG office ran out of depth, while the secretary became a rubber stamp. There were 7 members, the "right-sizing" made the chairman / chairwoman way too powerful on the administrative side while solving quorum and constant natural justice issues.

Then there was a dedicated appellate forum which was dismantled. Early on, the Supreme Court in Brahm Dutt noted that since the CCI acts as a judge and issues heavy penalties, it must feature judicial independence. This forced the government to create a separate appellate body, the COMPAT.

The government also responded with judicial members as well. Now the lack of a proper judicial member as mandated continues to haunt the CCI. The current "judicial member's" ties are known. The fact that no retired judge has walked into the CCI for nearly a decade speaks volumes. The judiciary doesnt see eye to eye on the government on this issue anymore.

Then in Mahindra & Mahindra v. CCI the Delhi High Court, which by all accounts is in decline did a u-turn. By legally labeling CCI an administrative body, the courts systematically lowered the constitutional bar for strict separation of powers. Combined with the erasure of the COMPAT all this reduced the quality of immediate, independent judicial checks on the CCI's consolidated powers.

Because the CCI dictates the opening of investigations, controls the DG, and now has total discretion to accept or reject settlements or issue global turnover penalties, it wields massive leverage. A company is often forced to settle with the "investigator" to avoid being crushed by the same entity acting as "judge." This permenantly casts a shadow on the CCI's settlement and commitment regime.

The completely myopic manner in which the CCI grew also was made worse when the CCI never passed enough interim measures. Being an appealable order, the CCI never strengthened its legal wing enough to sit and defend interim orders hard enough fearing the defense of pre-judgement. This was down to the administrative side weakness.

The institution has lost balance but blaming this on suo moto powers is something else. That was always within the original mandate of section 19. The problem was someone wanted to make the CCI controllable. Someone wanted the CCI being capable of turning around and fine 200 crores while asking to review the same markets, acceptable. Someone wanted the CCI to look away when needed from the various monopolies it by itself fostered.

Such structural issues that come with combining concentrated executive power and declining state capacity by serial underfunding allowed competition law to be converted from an independent body with a market protection mandate into a tool for consolidating autocratic control. Where have we seen this before?

We hear that there’s a new leadership (on paper and for the media and outside world of course) that is going to be announced - The prodigal son inherits the firm while the brilliant daughter takes a back seat. The father reins the kingdom as an emperor now and not the king and the father’s trusted lieutenant will remain a lieutenant whilst with a new refined title. Certain senior officers have not taken this too kindly and we also hear that the lieutenant has accepted this as he has indicated his intention to move on. While all this happens, nothing materially changes the current functioning and all this is to show the world that the future is in safe hands - is it though?

That is misleading or, at the very worst, deliberately incomplete by being devoid of context.

Defendants in the US frequently challenged the structural legitimacy of SEC and FTC administrative law judges, arguing their protection from removal violates Article II of the US Constitution. So to avoid getting bogged down in years of collateral constitutional litigation, the FTC increasingly files its heavy-hitting antitrust and consumer protection cases directly in federal district courts.

The recent conservative-majority US Supreme Court drove this, focusing on reining in the "administrative state", with Big Tech aggressively capitalising on these new legal weapons. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 6-3 conservative majority has indeed carried out what legal scholars call a systemic effort to deconstruct the "administrative state".

By systematically stripping away agencies' independent powers, the US Supreme Court purportedly attempts to shift structural power from unelected regulators directly into the hands of federal judges and the president. This is pushed by unitary executive theory, a constitutional law concept advanced by the Federalist Society, asserting that the president of the United States holds absolute control over the executive branch.

In the United States, this has been the cover for authoritarianism – institutions are viewed as being under attack.

Coming to India, we have a parliamentary system, and we do not have a theory of a unitary executive; the executive draws its powers from the legislature. We have a deliberate dual executive. Yes, we hear rants that we wish we had a presidential system, but we don't. We have Modi pushing for massive centralisation and pretty much undoing the independence of regulators, including the RBI. We just had the Supreme Court rule on the lack of the CJI in the selection committee for the CEC.

Most critically, unlike the US, we do not have state governments with their own antitrust laws that sweep into regulatory space where the federal government withdraws. Instead, we have independent regulators. It is not a new concept. Institutions like the RBI and CAG have operated in this manner for decades. Does India have the judicial strength of the United States? Tribunalisation was an answer to another problem. In India, for the CCI, we had Brahm Dutt and SAIL – the Supreme Court looked into this.

Now, coming to a simple point – the questioning of tribunalisation – it is legitimate, but for one particular regulator to surrender has all the hallmarks of sabotage backed by a law ministry or SG opinion. There are several other regulators who have suo motu powers and adjudicatory powers. SEBI (Section 11 & 11C of the SEBI Act), RERA (Section 35 of the RERA Act), CCPA (Section 10 & 18 of the Consumer Protection Act), etc. So why does one particular regulator commit harakiri before parliament?