By Suhail Nathani and Ravisekhar NairBy Suhail Nathani and Ravisekhar Nair

The CCI has established itself as an efficient and effective regulator.

We were counsel to the CCI in its early days. That was the time when we were able to get a positive outcome for the CCI before the Supreme Court in its judgment in CCI vs. SAIL, limiting the powers of the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) over the CCI. That judgment still holds in the matter of competition law. But a lot has changed since then.

In the first 2 years after notification of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act) there were no penalty orders. The first penalty order came in the FICCI Multiplex Association case where the CCI imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 lac each on film producers/ distributers. Since then we have seen orders of wide import impacting various sectors and industries and the manner in which they do business.

With the notification of the merger control regime in 2011, the CCI came into its own with the requirement to seek its approval being a part of many corporate deals. Very recently the Government of India has greatly relaxed merger control norms. A March 2017 notification recognized the value of assets and turnover of business divisions as constituting the relevant assets and turnover for the purposes of Section 5 of the Act. This will go a long way in ensuring ease of doing business in India. The long awaited clarification on whether mergers and amalgamations also benefit from the de-minimis exemption is also a welcome step. It will reduce the burden on the CCI and be a welcome reprieve for companies who will now not need to take CCI approvals for these transactions.

Sector specific impact of the CCI and significant rulings

The CCI has seen some very significant rulings since the notification of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act in May, 2009 in several sectors. Practitioners and critics can agree to disagree on the performance of the CCI – particularly in terms of appellate authority intervention and the amount of penalty realised into the consolidated fund – (a meagre .01% of a total penalty of approximately 1500 crore (around $230m) levied in 2015-16 was realised). But what is important is that the number of filings before the CCI is rising gradually showing that parties are increasingly reposing faith in the regulator.

Real estate sector:

The CCI’s annual report of 2015-2016 shows that after nearly 8 years of enforcement of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, the sector that has seen the highest number of complaints and orders has been real estate. In the absence of a sector regulator, people were drawn to the CCI – the DLF case set the stage for many complaints against other Real Estate Developers. However, now with the enactment of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016, this trend will likely change.

Let us consider the DLF case which is pending in the Supreme Court. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 addresses consumer disputes against traders directly, while the Competition Act addresses consumer welfare indirectly by ensuring that efficiencies are promoted and more choices are available to consumers.

But in practice we see that this distinction is often very blurred. The DLF case is a significant example of direct regulation in favour of the consumer. It involved a complaint by an association of apartment owners assailing certain terms and conditions in property developer DLF’s standard form Apartment Buyer’s Agreement and alleging abuse of dominance by DLF. These terms included DLF’s discretion to change the layout and nature of use of the apartment complex without the consent of apartment allottees, its right to change the super area of the complex without consulting allottees and other clauses including additional payments. Additionally, the complaint charged DLF with imposing unfair terms in its conduct against apartment allottees. In a final order penalizing DLF with a penalty of 6.3 billion rupees, the CCI directed DLF to cease and desist from ‘formulating’ and ‘imposing’ ‘unfair’ terms in its agreements with buyers in Gurgaon. The CCI also directed DLF to modify its agreements with buyers. The order characterised the abuse practiced by DLF as ‘unfair’ and ‘even exploitative.’

The DLF case presents an interesting example of how the lines between competition and consumer law are often blurred. The CCI held that DLF’s real estate malpractices distorted competition in the market for high end residential apartments in Gurgaon - a narrow geographic coverage of a satellite town in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

The CCI held that such practices reduced the ease of moving between services or offerings. It therefore suggested that for those consumers who had exercised an option to purchase an apartment from DLF, the incremental cost of switching to another real estate developer and absence of adequate information to the consumer to understand the value and cost of his investment, distorted competition for other real estate players.

While arguably the CCI did identify a theory of harm in the competition space, whether these measures resulted in increased choice, quality and price competition in the real estate space for consumers is debatable. The CCI answers these questions in part where it considers the effects of DLF’s conduct on other players in the real estate space and particularly in the real estate market: it said that other players are likely to imitate the terms and conditions employed by DLF: a consequence that would impede consumer welfare.

While affirming the CCI’s decision in appeal, the COMPAT noted in appeal that “the order of CCI as well as this judgment is expected to go a long way to ameliorate all the conditions of the customers.” To date DLF remains the only case in the real estate sector that has passed two levels of antitrust scrutiny. If the flurry of cases that were brought before the CCI on real estate malpractices following the CCI verdict is anything to go by, the consumer remedies granted in DLF would not benefit consumers who are dealing with smaller real estate developers. The CCI’s recommendations to the Government of India in the DLF case on the prevalence of ‘unfair trade practices’ in the real estate sector are perhaps a testament to the regulator’s laudable attempt to balance equities in a first of its kind direct consumer harm case.

Financial and Media sectors:

The Financial Sector and Media and Entertainment followed in close second to Real Estate with an almost equal number of cases. One of the most significant rulings in the Financial sector is in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) case. Here too the CCI saw some success with the adoption of its decision by the COMPAT- but not before some remarks by the COMPAT on the CCI’s market definition. The case is now pending before the Supreme Court and rival stock exchange MCX has moved a compensation application before the COMPAT. The CCI’s decision in NSE again looked at market dynamics in a single paradigm.

It maintained that conduct that even a single competitor finds objectionable is conduct that can be assailed under the Competition Act. Surely that cannot be the intent of the Act. One can argue, that in the case of NSE and MCX there was really only one competitor who traded in currency derivates- but that cannot be the basis for laying down a precedent on unfair pricing. The term ‘unfair’ cannot be construed so narrowly so as to assail conduct that a single competitor finds objectionable. That term must necessarily relate to whether conduct is harmful to competition in general. Perhaps this is a question that will be answered in later decisions and with more CCI decisions being challenged in appeal.

The media and entertainment sector also recently saw the CCI look at television rating measurement in the Prasar Bharti case – a case that the CCI subsequently closed. The film distribution cases also occupied the field with the CCI looking into agreements between film producers, distributors and exhibitors for anti-competitive conduct.

Pharmaceutical sector:

In third place is the pharmaceutical sector on account of the CCI’s many interventions in the practice of issuing No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for the appointment of stockists and distributors for pharmaceutical drugs and the fixing of trade margins. Its orders were upset by the COMPAT including in AIOCD vs. CCI and Ors.

where the COMPAT noted that there were clear indications from third parties that an NOC was not mandatory and these statements were clearly ignored by the DG and the CCI. COMPAT held that the system of NOC was approved by the Mashelkar Committee, a committee consisting of expert and distinguished members, and its recommendation should not have been ignored. It also found that display of drug prices was a mandatory requirement under the Drug (Price Control) Order, 1995 and the mechanism of facilitating the advertising of the drug prices could not be considered as anti-competitive on the premise that the mechanism limits or controls supply, or production of the product.

With the Government of India recently indicating that it is inclined towards introducing a law so that doctors prescribe generic drugs to reduce healthcare costs, greater inclusion in the list of essential drugs and the 2014 notification of a wider Drug Price Control Order, the decisions will raise new questions of quality control and pricing, entry and quality control of generic medicine. And it remains to be seen how the CCI will respond.

Petroleum/ Gas sector:

The CCI has had the occasion to look into the business practices of oil marketing companies on several occasions. One of the ongoing cases is looking into an alleged ethanol cartel for supply of ethanol to oil marketing companies under the ethanol blending programme. This case also alleged that the oil marketing companies had formed a buyer’s cartel to procure preferential price and quantities of ethanol from suppliers. On this point of law - buyer cartels - the CCI is yet to make a mark. No singular decision of the CCI looks at buyer cartels definitively. Indeed, the CCI has already ruled that oil marketing companies cannot be accused of having formed a buyer’s cartel in the First Indian Glycols case (the subsequent case is still being looked into). The CCI has in the past expressed its reservation in looking at the purchasing activities of enterprises. In Pandrol Rahee, the CCI noted that “the decision making process of a consumer or exercise of consumer’s choice in purchasing activity of a consumer is not a matter of Section 3 ...”

Buyer cartels are a matter of significant antitrust interest. Joint procurement agreements/arrangements may give rise to competition concerns in the capacity of the relative bargaining power of the buyer and the existence of a monopsony and may be subject to the following, amongst other, competitive impact assessment:

(i) In a market with a dominant buyer, the possibility that such a buyer restricts its purchase requirement to lower prices cannot be excluded.

(ii) A large buyer with a stable buying requirement may also not incentivize the supplier to innovate or improve its service because the supplier knows that there is a ready buyer. A stronger buyer can also eat into the supplier’s profits.

(iii) If you are a big buyer and are able to get product feed for cheap, it is easy to undercut your rivals in the buyer’s market. It can also lead to a situation in which the other buyers (with smaller requirements) have to pay a greater price for the product fee. They pass on the increased price onto their customers, while the big buyer’s products are cheaper and more attractive.

But we are yet to see a CCI decision looking at or laying down the law on competition scrutiny of buyer cartels.

Miscellaneous:

Another intervention worthy of note is the COMPAT’s direction of an investigation into the practices of Uber- an order that was subsequently stayed by the Supreme Court. It saw the COMPAT revisiting a CCI order declining to initiate an investigation against Uber. But what is important is that we see the COMPAT revisiting the CCI’s order on merits. And especially where the COMPAT looks at Uber’s business model network effects (the displayed value of the use of a product or service by a person on others - the greater the number of subscribers, the more valuable the business). Look at it this way, if you used the Uber application on your mobile and didn’t find a single driver- would you use it? No. The COMPAT’s assessment of network effects in this case to be a guiding factor in its dominance analysis is laudable and we hope to see more of such intuitive decisions in the future.

Timeliness of regulatory practices

The CCI is doing exceedingly well in the timely disposal of merger control cases. CCI’s Annual Report for the year 2015-2016 shows the trends in disposal of merger control cases. It reflects both efficiency and timeliness. For example, the average number of days for disposal of merger control cases has ranged between 16.5 days in the year 2011-2012 with 47 cases to 26.4 days in the year 2015-16 with 127 cases. These are very impressive figures. The annual report also reveals that out of the 113 notices received during 2015-16, 97 were in Form-I (the short form) and 16 were in Form-II (the long form). A sector-wise break-up of the 113 notices (along with their respective shares in total notices filed) includes: Finance and Markets (22%); Pharmaceuticals & Health Care (11%); Information Technology and Services (11%); PVC & Chemicals (10%); Auto & Auto Components (4%); Mining & Metals (2%); Power & Power Generation (1%); Media & Entertainment (2%); Food & Refined Oil (4%); and Miscellaneous (35%).

But what is most impressive is the individual number of days taken to dispose of Form I and Form II cases. The annual report reveals that in the year 2015-16, of the 107 notices decided by the CCI, 79.43% notices (85 notices) were decided within 30 days, another 18.69% notices (20 notices) were decided within 60 days, less than 1% of notices (1 notice) were decided within 120 days and, again, only 1 notice was decided within 210 days.

The same cannot be said for behavioural cases under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. While the regulations require the Director General to complete an investigation within 60 days, that is rarely the case. In cases that did not involve any supervisory court intervention, stays on investigation and other intervening events, it is seen that the investigation has lasted for more than six months. Naturally more complex cases require longer periods to investigate and adjudicate.

These cases include cases shown in the table below.

Timelines of CCI casesTimelines of CCI cases

Emerging trends and policy issues

(i) Commitments and plea bargaining in behavioural cases.

In a change of trend, the CCI is increasingly looking to invite parties for a hearing before passing an initiation order. Pre-initiation hearings have increased by 50% percent in the year 2016 as compared to 2015. But more importantly, closure orders after providing this hearing have increased. This shows that the CCI is productively using this opportunity to filter out cases that do not raise competition concerns.

A new trend has emerged in the last few months regarding closure of a case pursuant to commitments offered by parties. We saw this happening in Prem Prakash vs. Principal Secretary where the CCI noted that the Central Public Works Department had modified its Works Manual to make it competition law compliant. It closed the case by observing that no further action was required to be taken. This is a welcome step both in terms of time and cost saving and efficient regulation. It remains to be seen whether the CCI will treat commitments offered by private enterprises on a similar footing.

(ii) Traditional vs. forward looking approach in merger control cases.

Merger control cases have seen an increased tolerance for behaviour versus structural remedies. For instance, PVR saw a split verdict on the acceptability of behavioural remedies with three Members of the CCI dissenting to say that price caps on tickets and food and beverage prices were acceptable means to avoid an anti-competitive outcome.

This decision was of course led by the majority view which imposed structural remedies along with some behavioural remedies. But the world over the trend seems to be to prefer structural over behavioural remedies. Very recently the European Commission has blocked the big LSE and Deutsche Börse merger since “[those] parties were, however, only prepared to offer a complex set of behavioural measures but not the divestiture of [LSE’s]fixed income trading platform.” That is the trend in merger control cases where regulators tend to prefer structural remedies over behavioural ones.

Behavioural remedies, in their opinion, are difficult to monitor.

The Indian situation may call for a different approach. The regulator or its monitoring agency doesn’t really have to monitor this process.

We live in a country where in the Supreme Court’s own words, a lot of litigation is proxy litigation. Increasingly the COMPAT has also been directing the CCI to look into the authenticity of complaints filed before it – including in the Hiranandani Hospital case. It doesn’t take a moment for a motivated or misguided informant to reach out to the CCI and say that there was non-compliance of behavioural remedies. That is enough to initiate an inquiry into non-compliance. Like the minority order in PVR notes, behavioural remedies impose a higher administrative burden on the regulator - but that cannot be a ground to reject an otherwise appropriate remedy, especially one that benefits consumers and competition.

(iii) ‘Sandbox Approach’ in handling tech cases.

The United Kingdom floated the idea of a ‘regulatory sandbox’ for financial services in 2015. A regulatory sandbox is a ‘safe space’in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question.

This is an interesting model to follow for technology cases. Those cases involve reviewing any competition harm that may arise from implementation of a new technology. A sandbox approach allows the innovator to test the technology for a period of time before it can come under regulatory scrutiny.

Technology cases present their own unique challenges before the regulator.

Technology cases present a ‘constant development’ challenge that regulators have to deal with. Can you take a forward looking approach in technology cases? Would it be helpful to wait and test for technology to proliferate in a ‘sandbox’ before you start regulating it? Such models should be viewed favourably since that would reduce the burden on the regulator and also give technology some breathing space so it can develop and benefit both consumers and the market.

Another challenge that regulators are seized with is whether technology development that has discernable consumer and competition benefit outweighs any abstract competition concerns raised by self-interested competitors. We often see that competitors who do not innovate raise fictitious and abstract complaints against companies who do. The motive is to stifle competition and innovation by inviting antitrust scrutiny. Should such bona fide product innovations not be insulated from competition law scrutiny? And where there is credible evidence that no anti-competition effect exists, would the CCI not be precluded from scrutinising such innovations? Technology cases call for a net-benefit approach. Where technology is useful for the consumer and the market, self-interested competition claims should be summarily rejected by the CCI.

(iv) The role of the Appellate Tribunal- developing jurisprudence while also applying rules of natural justice.

Increasingly we are seeing a lot of the orders of the Competition Appellate Tribunal setting aside CCI decisions on procedural and natural justice grounds. This leaves a lot to be said about development of the law. While appellate review rightly instructs the CCI to look into issues of procedure, the development of the law cannot wait endlessly for the odd procedurally perfect case. A closer look at the CCI’s procedural regulations also leaves much to be desired and much to be circumspect about. The Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 (General Regulations) recognise evidence in the form of unsworn statements of individuals or signed responses to written questionnaires or interviews. But when such evidence is taken by the Director General, parties argue, and rightly so – that there is no way to check the authenticity of the evidence. The evidence is liable to be excluded when viewed in the context of general rules of evidence applicable to all quasi-judicial processes (the Evidence Act is inapplicable to the CCI), but look then at the General Regulations which expressly allow such evidence! There is no right or wrong approach here.

Ideally it is up to the CCI to look into the evidence and see if it inspires confidence. In the GSK/ Sanofi case for example, the DG while investigating found that representatives of GSK and Sanofi signed a register with the same black pen. The COMPAT set aside this decision noting that this cannot by any stretch of imagination lend an inference of collusion. The probative value of evidence is really a subjective examination. If the regulator finds that a piece of evidence is probative based on sound principles, such decisions will withstand appellate scrutiny.

But the development of the law cannot be left on the back seat. We see many matters being remanded by the COMPAT to the CCI on natural justice grounds. Equally many CCI decisions do not apply the law laid down by COMPAT. This back and forth leaves the development of the law in a lurch.

We have recently seen the Supreme Court intervening in a COMPAT order and upholding the original decision of the CCI in CCI vs. Co-ordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of W.B. Film and Television and Ors. That decision did lay down the law holding that trade associations who act collusively at the behest of their constituent members cannot avoid competition law scrutiny on the basis of Article 19 of the Constitution – their right to lodge protests (boycotts). Hopefully the coming years will see more decisions by the Supreme Court as that will clear the air on issues that are still being debated between the COMPAT and the CCI.

(v) Some perspectives on how the shifting of competition appeals to the NCLAT will work.

This is a regressive move as competition law is very different from company law. They both occupy different fields even as they are both under the same ministerial control of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Theoretically, competition law looks at curbing anti-competition practices of companies while company law looks at the rights and liabilities of companies and their members. These are completely different fields. While the finance bill has introduced this move, there is still some uncertainty on how the shift will happen between the COMPAT and the NCLAT.

The inconspicuous absence of appeals against orders under Section 26(8) of the Competition Act in the Finance Act is yet another aspect that could have been improved in the Act. Currently there is no appeal provision available to an aggrieved party where the CCI reverses a report of a Director General that recommends violation of the Competition Act. This should have been considered in the amending act as its absence denies an appellate remedy to a party who won in terms of the Director General’s report but lost before the CCI.

ELP Partner Profiles

Suhail Nathani, Managing Partner

T: +91 22 6636 7000

E:

Competition Law & Policy | Corporate & Commercial | Capital Markets & Securities Laws | International Trade & Customs | Private Equity & Venture Capital

Suhail Nathani is the Managing Partner of ELP and co-heads the Competition Law & Policy practice of the firm.

Suhail NathaniSuhail Nathani

With over 24 years of experience, Suhail is considered one of the leading lawyers in the field of competition law. Having extensive experience in handling competition related matters before the CCI and COMPAT, he is regularly consulted by the CCI for his legal expertise on substantive issues of law. He has also represented various regulatory agencies, including the CCI and the Securities and Exchange Board of India at the Supreme Court and various other courts in India and is admired for providing innovative solution oriented approach in complex matters. Suhail handles a full range of competition related matters, including merger control, anti-competitive agreements (including cartel enforcement), abuse of dominance, competition advisory, competition audit and compliance.

Suhail has been part of the “Law Firm Working Group” formed by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to give a final shape to the merger regulations of the country and has worked very closely with the Department for International Development to re-write the competition and consumer laws in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Suhail has authored several publications on various legal topics, including competition law, cartel enforcement and merger control and regularly speaks in various forums on competition law.

Suhail has been recognised amongst the top 30 International Trade practitioners in the world by the Best of the Best Expert Guides 2016. He has been ranked by the Chambers Asia-Pacific 2012 to 2017 for his expertise in for his expertise in Competition/Antitrust, Corporate M&A and International Trade and has been recommended as a Leading Lawyer by The Legal500 Asia-Pacific for the past 8 years. He has been recognised for his expertise in the Who’s Who Legal 2013 to 2017; and has also been identified as a Leading Lawyer by Asialaw Leading Lawyers 2014 to 2017. He has also featured as a Leading Lawyer in IFLR1000

Financial & Corporate 2015 to 2017. He has been on the jury for BW Businessworld-PwC I-bank 2016 Awards. He has featured in the India Business Law Journal’s A List as one of India’s Top 100 Lawyers.

Suhail also heads the International Trade & Customs, Corporate & Commercial, Private Equity & Venture Capital and Capital Markets & Securities Laws practices of the firm. He has recently been appointed as a member of IBA’s India Contact Group and is also a part of the Host Committee which organised the 5th Asia Pacific Regional Forum Biennial Conference for the IBA Asia Pacific Regional Forum. He is an Honorary Adjunct Professor at the Jindal Global Law School in India; and also serves as an independent director on three listed companies in India, including a scheduled bank.

Suhail earned his Master’s Degree at Cambridge University, England and has also received an LL.M. from Duke University, USA. Apart from India, he is also admitted to the State Bar of New York. Prior to ELP, he was the General Counsel in a start-up FCC licensed telecommunications carrier in Washington, DC that went public.

Ravisekhar Nair, Partner

T: +91 11 4152 8400

E:

Competition Law & Policy

Ravisekhar NairRavisekhar Nair

Ravisekhar Nair is a Partner at ELP and a part of the Competition Law & Policy practice of the firm. He also works closely with the Corporate & Commercial team. With over 10 years of experience, he is currently involved in some of the most contentious cases pending before the Competition Commission of India. He earned his LL.M. from the University of Queensland, Australia.

Ravi has successfully represented clients in various investigations and inquiries before the CCI, the DG and in appeals before the COMPAT, various High Courts in India and the Supreme Court of India. He renders competition compliance services for clients, which include Competition Compliance Audits, the design and roll-out of Competition Compliance Training Programmes for staff and managerial level officials, and the design and implementation of Competition Compliance Manuals.

Ravi was part of the “Law Firm Working Group” formed by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to give a final shape to the merger regulations governing combinations in India and has closely worked with the CCI to get various processes and procedures in place apart from providing assistance on the substantive issues of law. Ravi has assisted the CCI on framing the draft Regulations of 2008 and 2009, the 2007 amendments to the Competition Act, 2002.

Ravi has various publications on competition law to his credit and regularly speaks at various forums on competition law. Ravi has been Highly Recommended for his expertise in Competition/ Antitrust by the Chambers Asia-Pacific 2016 & 2017. Prior to ELP, Ravi was working as a Managing Associate with Luthra & Luthra Law Offices, New Delhi.

About the firm

Economic Laws Practice (ELP) is a leading full-service law firm, headquartered in Mumbai, India. The firm was established in the year 2001 by highly eminent lawyers from diverse fields who envisioned a firm that would bring to the table a unique blend of professionals, ranging from lawyers, chartered accountants, cost accountants, economists to company secretaries. The partners at ELP are not only knowledge leaders but thought leaders as well; enabling the firm to offer seamless cross-practice legal services, through top-of-the-line expertise to clients.

With 6 offices across India (Mumbai, New Delhi, Pune, Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Chennai), ELP has a team of over 170 qualified professionals. Working closely with leading national and international law firms in the UK, U.S., Middle East and the Asia Pacific region, gives ELP the ability to provide an extensive pan India and global service offering to our clients adding to the seamless service that the firm prides itself on.

ELP has a unique positioning amongst law firms in India from the perspective of offering comprehensive services across the entire spectrum of transactional, advisory, litigation, regulatory, and tax matters. The firm’s areas of expertise include Banking & Finance; Competition Law & Policy; Corporate & Commercial; Hospitality; Infrastructure (includes energy, oil & gas, mining and construction); International Trade & Customs; Litigation & Dispute Resolution; Private Equity & Venture Capital; Securities Laws & Capital Markets; Tax; and Telecommunication, Media & Technology.

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ELP is firm of choice for clients due to our commitment to deliver excellence and has been ranked amongst the Top 10 firms in the country; with the highest Client Satisfaction score of 9/10 amongst the Top 10 firms as per RSG India Report 2015. The firm has also recently been recognised as Top Tier firm in India for Dispute Resolution, Antitrust & Competition, Project & Energy, Tax, WTO and International Trade by the Legal 500 Asia-Pacific 2017. “Highly Recommended” in 6 practice areas by IFLR1000 Financial & Corporate Guide 2017 and recognised by Asialaw Profiles 2017 as “Outstanding Firm for Tax”. Ranked in Chambers & Partners Asia-Pacific Guide 2017 for 9 practice areas.

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Like +2 Object -8 Competitionlawyer 19 Jul 17, 11:33
Great article. very informative and well written.
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Like +1 Object -4 Nowal 20 Jul 17, 00:49
[...] The article should [...] inform the general public that the reason any competition regulator does not have opt for behavioural remedies is the simple issue of bandwidth and monitoring. Cci requires more staff to carry out its functions well.
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Like +6 Object -0 What a joke! 21 Jul 17, 16:44  interesting
Having worked with the CCI almost from the outset, I can confidently say that the CCI is one of the most incompetent and unprofessional regulators around. The immense stupidity of the questions put forth on their RFI's boggles the mind! The CCI members are retired bureaucrats who work for 2-3 hours a day and pass on their lazyness and lack of interest to the staff below them.
Radical changes are needed!
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