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Secondly (and maybe I should've brought this up earlier), how is a suo moto mechanism helping with speed anyways? We've discussed extensively on the need for a faster mechanism without even establishing a causal link between the two.
Third - if we are concerned about institutional capture (I echo this concern), won't forcing the CCI to expand its wings further worsen things? My fear is that active suo moto enforcement could further embolden and institutionalise CCI's role in battling for these select few without even waiting for a formality complaint (as they did in cases like Amazon which surprise surprise eventually got reversed).
Fourth - The Meta decision actually reinforced my views against this dual setup. One casual look at the CCI order - the clear logical fallacies, lack of any independent analysis etc. would show the CCI just wanted to rubber stamp its pre-determined infringement mindset without even doing the most basic of work. This is probably why the first rule of natural justice requires no party to be a judge in their own cause. This becomes especially important for an authority which is expected to regulate its own procedure while adhering to natural justice, while being run by politically appointed members who are easy to replace, none of whom have judicial experience.
On state enforcement - I understand your point. However, I don't believe this has a correlation with the merits or demerits of a suo moto mandate. My criticisms would persist even if the Advocate Generals for Maharashtra or Karnataka decide to pursue active antitrust enforcement. Going back to my argument above, if an institution is indeed captured, how is vesting it with further discretionary powers an effective remedy?
Lastly, I completely agree with you on the CCI's abysmal state. And maybe I should clarify, I don't blame suo moto powers for where we are today. The reasons, like you mentioned. are largely the patchy fundamental structure, the lack of adherence to explicit constitutional directions and a perennial lack of funding over the years. I think we just disagree on our underlying fundamental principles. Best to just agree to disagree.
PS: Glad to have had a respectful engaging debate on this platform for a change!
https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2026/Jul/26/avoiding-suo-motu-cases-unless-nobody-is-willing-to-come-forward-cci
We now have to read about competition law sponsored by Amazon from NLU Delhi.
Incredible.