The NDA government today questioned the primacy of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the judiciary in appointments to the higher courts’ judiciary but the Supreme Court said that having accepted the collegium system in 1998, the government couldn’t go back on it now.
“If the primacy of CJI in judicial appointment was not there in the constitution or in the constituent assembly debates, the interpretation of the constitutional provision by the 1993 judgment (which accorded the CJI primacy) has to be re-heard by the nine judges bench,” argued Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi before a five-judge constitution bench.
At this, the bench of Justice JS Khehar, Justice J Chelameswar, Justice Madan B Lokur, Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice AK Goel told him “that when (the 1993) judgment was under consideration (in 1998) at your behest, you had accepted it (collegium system).”
There was a National Democratic Alliance government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998.
“That would be a dangerous” that every time with a change of regime, judicial pronouncements that have been accepted and attained finality are questioned, the court said telling the attorney general that there was no challenge to 1993 judgment he was seeking to question.
Justice Khehar told Rohatgi that instead of questioning the correctness of the 1993 judgment which was not under challenge, he should better tell the court how the National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) was a better alternative.
“You should show us that this alternate system is also independent and we will accept it,” the court asked Rohatgi, telling him that “the citizen of the country is worried that the judges in the courts are impartial and is concerned that a stakeholder (government in litigations before the court) should not participate in the selection process (of judges)” as it may prejudice his cause before the courts.
Describing CJI as one among the other apex court judges and under the constitution, it being “imperative to consult him on judicial appointments”, Rohatgi told the bench that if any primacy was accorded to the views of the CJI, then it would destroy consultation with other judges as provided under the constitution’s article 124.
Noting “consultation” with the CJI in the matter of judicial appointment should be treated as “concurrence” had not found favour even with the framers of the constitution in the constituent assembly, he mentioned the specific move that was turned down in this regard.
“CJI’s views does not have primacy when contrasted with the views of other judges of the apex court,” Rohatgi said, leading Justice Joseph to observe: “The way you read article 124 it would mean the primacy of the executive in judicial appointments.”
Defending the government’s position to replace the collegium system with NJAC, Rohatgi said that separation of power did not mean any “watertight compartmentalisation” of judicial power in the matter of appointment of judges.
Resuming his inclusive arguments from Friday, senior counsel Rajeev Dhavan told the court that “NJAC was a hotchpotch of the worst possible kind and had nothing to do with the independence of judiciary” as there is an element of executive involvement in the selection of judges.
Responding to a query by Justice Goel whether appointment of judges was within the “judicial power” or executive power” or if it was a “judicial function”, he said that “it was essentially a judicial function with executive participation.”
Pointing gaps in the NJAC as nowhere it is mentioned that NJAC could not meet without all the six members present, Dhavan said that the “selection process lacks criteria” and as far as one eminent member from reserved category was concerned, it was not clear who will get nominated or when their turn will come.
He also contended said that the reservation in NJAC was contrary to constitutional provisions as far as judicial appointments were concerned.
Describing NJAC as a “khichdi”, Dhavan wondered if there could be a situation where three members may sit and decide on appointments to the higher judiciary.
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In no other country in the world do judges appoint judges.
As such it has to necessarily be an executive function.
The 1993 judgement was wrong.
This argument by Fali S. Nariman is fallacy of FALSE DICHOTOMY. It is not simply a black and white issue as Fali Nariman states it to be. There is a THIRD issue that needs to be settled by a larger bench.
While some portions of the 1993/1998 judgments are invalidated/wiped-out by the Article 124/124A Amendments, there is still arguably a surviving portion of the 1993/1998 judgments that holds the supremacy of the CJI based on their (1993 Court's) reading of the fundamental structure of the Constitution. In 1993, because there was no clear mention of supremacy of the CJI in the fundamental structure of the Constitution, the 1993 Court was forced to read into the Constitution a supremacy of the CJI, just to justify adhoc the Collegium system.
Today, with the Art 124A amendment in place, and with the 2015 Constitution clearly stating the supremacy of the NJAC, the earlier excuse or compulsion, available in 1993, to read into the fundamental structure of the Constitution a supremacy of CJI, is no longer available, valid or relevant. However ,that ruling must come from the Court. Therefore, a larger bench needs to hold that the NJAC is now supreme and consistent with the fundamental structure of the Constitution.
Bottom line:
1.) Does the fundamental structure of the Constitution make CJI supreme when no such mention is explicitly stated in the 1993 version of the Constitution? If No, then:
2.) Is the fundamental structure of the Constitution consistent with the 2015 Constitutional Amendments 124 and 124A explicitly stating and making NJAC supreme?
If answer to 1.) above is yes, then Amendments 124 and 124A are invalid & Case is closed.
If answer to 1.) above is no, then question 2.) needs to be further answered.
Therefore, on the subtle issue of whether supremacy of CJI is purportedly built into the fundamental structure of Constitution, a larger bench needs to re-answer question 1.) in light of changed circumstances of the 2015 Amendment, unless the 5-Bench Court has power to overturn the 9-Bench ruling on the reason that the 1993/1998 rulings are trivially null & void because question 1.) is now irrelevant in light of the new Amendments 124/124A.
However, a 5-Bench constructively overruling a 9-Bench will potentially open the door to unnecessary cases from litigants in the future on matters concerning judicial appointments made by the NJAC, and will kick-the-can-down-the-road on the issue stated in question 1.) above, because dim-witted litigants will continue to claim the 1993 ruling still holds.
Therefore, the issue in question 1.) must be settled now by a larger Bench.
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